





Managing Access Control for Things: a Capability Based Approach

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TXT e-solutions SpA

IoT@Work Project Summary Sheet



EU funded Project

- Duration: 3 years
- ➤ Approx. 3.5 Mio € Funding
- > (Total Budget ~ 5.9 Mio €)
- > Started on June 2010
- ➤ 6 Partners from Industry and Research

Vision

- IoT Supporting Agile & Smart Manufacturing Systems
- Plug&Play IoT solution for Manufacturing



Project coordinator network & security



Security
Configuration Management







Scenarios & requirements pilot



Software Engineering & middleware aspects



Software Engineering system modelling



Automation & Engineering



IoT Peculiarities (Access Control point of view)



- Potentially unbounded number of interacting subjects (things, applications, humans)
- Users/usage:
 - ✓ Non-ICT skilled users
 - ✓ Everyday life
- Interaction patterns:
 - ✓ Traditional patterns: planned and long-lived
 - √ IoT world: short-lived, often casual and/or spontaneous
- Context relevance:
 - ✓ Actions/requests/data/... analysis can depend from a set of other data sources (i.e. requestor/provider context)
- Resource constraints
- ...



Access Control for IoT: Requirements



Access Control solutions that:

- face the IoT scalability challenge
- are easy to use, easy to understand and easy to manage
- can be deployed on *simple* devices (e.g.: reduce the amount of *supporting* data, communications, etc.)
- are secure
- support advanced features (e.g.: access rights delegation, auditability, ...)
- are flexible
- •



Current Approaches & Related Issues



Traditional Access Control models:

- ✓ RBAC (Role Based Access Control)
 - Identities
 - Roles
 - Identities → Roles assignment
 - Trust of Identity Providers (IdP) and/or Service Providers (SP)
 - **ABAC (Attributes Based Access Control)**
 - Attribute names
 - Attribute meanings
 - Identities
 - Trust of IdPs, SPs, Attributes Providers (APs)
- Issues:
 - ✓ **Usability** (in particular in end-user' centered scenarios)
 - ✓ Do not scale Scalability is a key issue in IoT contexts (explosion of resources/subjects)
 - **✓** Require significant Management effort Management a nightmare in IoT contexts (explosion of resources/operations)

 - ✓ Security issues, auditability to orchestrate/integrate)




Capability Based Security




Capability based security: what is it?

• is a security model in which "... a capability (known in some systems as a key) is a communicable, unforgeable token of authority. It refers to a value that references an object along with an associated set of access rights"







Not a new concept:

- Levy "Capability-Based Computer Systems" (1984)
- Tanenbaum "Using Sparse Capabilities in a Distributed Operating System" (1986)
- "RFC2693 SPKI Certificate Theory" (1999)
- Miller "Capability Myths Demolished" (2003)
- Karp "Solving the Transitive Access Problem for the Services Oriented Architecture" (2010)
- ...



Capab. Based Security: Previous Experiences



Xerox Parc Casca Collaboration application:

Access control for shared virtual spaces **Digital Ecosystem** Digital Ecosystem (Skinner): (2) (1) Client's Get Client's Resource Access **Access Rights** Attributes Knowledge Base Client's Access **Digital Ecosystem Policy Decision Point** Capability Token **Clients Portal Capability Generator (4**) Client's Request Bob Access capability Token Resource **Provider**

- IBM Trusted Virtual Data Center (M. Factor):
 - Capability-based Command Security (CbCS): extension to the SCSI protocol for access control to networked storage devices

Capability Based Access Control Pros



Capability Based Authorization Pros:

- ✓ Principle of Least Authority (PoLA) (Least Privilege) is the default
- ✓ Easy to understand and easy to use for end-users
- ✓ more fine-grained access control
- ✓ less security issues (e.g. no *Confused Deputy* problem)
- ✓ capability model <u>externalizes</u> the authorization management process
- ✓ no need to manage issues related to complexity and dynamics of subject's identities
- Why Capability in FP7 IoT@Work (a factory automation focused project):
 - many subjects (suppliers, maintainers, etc.) need to access resources in the production plant
 - ✓ Least Privilege is a must!
 - ✓ need to easily delegate rights and to have full auditability of resource access
 - ✓ need to offload management to face external subjects dynamics




Use-case Example: current approach



The Problem:

- ✓ Bob has to go on holidays
- ✓ his house needs some housekeeping while Bob is away
- ✓ his neighbour Dave offered to takes care of Bob's house housekeeping
- √ how does Bob currently proceed?



Issues:

- ✓ Dave could use the house's keys for non-envisaged/non-authorized activities
- ✓ Dave could make a duplicate of Bob's keys
- ✓ Bob has no real control on what Dave is doing or could do




Use-case Example: capability based approach



Bob issues a Capability Token (digital token) to Dave that:

- identifies Dave has the only subject entitled to use the token
- states what Dave can perform (e.g. monitoring and configuring Bob's garden watering system)
- states for how many days Dave can do these actions (i.e. token validity period)



Pros:

- Dave cannot use Bob's token for non-envisaged/non-authorized activities
- Dave cannot pass the token to someone else, nor can use it outside the validity period
- ✓ Easy to understand and easy to use approach (no rules to manage, fire&forget,

CapBAC Specific Features




- Delegation Support: a subject can grant the right to further delegate all or part of the granted rights to a third subject
- **Capability revocation:** capabilities can be revoked by properly authorized subjects
- Information granularity: a capability can grant access to a specific resource specifying also the level of detail granted
- XML representation: Capability Tokens have an XML representation (i.e. a digitally signed XML doc that can therefore be transferred by any means)
- SAML/XACML based: we use/extend SAML/XACML for capability token's elements



CapBAC Overall Scenario








CapBAC Information Control







CapBAC Token Characteristics (1)



XML based





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CapBAC Token Characteristics (2)



Token Types:

- > Root Capability Token: the 1st in chain Capability
 - ✓ issued by the Owner of the identified resource
 - ✓ Is a *normal* capability where:
 - √ the <u>Granter</u> and <u>Grantee</u> subjects are the same (Issuer == Subject)
 - ✓ The IssuerAccessRightsCapability (i.e. the *previous-in-chain* capability) is empty!
- Non Root Capability Token: a capability that has a predecessor
 - ✓ The grants are a subset of its predecessor capability
 - ✓ the <u>Granter</u> and <u>Grantee</u> subjects are normally different
 - ✓ The IssuerAccessRightsCapability contains the predecessor capability
- Chain of Capabilities:





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CapBAC Mandatory Functional Elements



dd11/mm11/vv11


dd22//mm22/yy22

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Cartoonia Inc

ddx2//mmx2/vvx2

- Authorization capability: details granted rights, delegation rights, the resource, the issuer, grantee
- **Resource manager**: service provider in charge of managing the identified resource
- **Service/operation request**: set of information to actually gain access to the resource via the service provider






CapBAC Discretionary Functional Elements



- Policy Decision Point: service in charge of access request validation and decision
- ☐ Capability Revocation Request: revokes one or more capabilities
- Capability Revocation Service: in charge of managing capability revocations



CapBAC Access Token Generation (1)



Currently using a stand alone Java-Based Wizard that guides the user

(so anyone can run it)








CapBAC Access Token Generation (2)



Access token generation is not a security sensitive operation (so anyone

can generate tokens)

e-solutions







CapBAC Access Token Generation (3)



No big differences between *Root Tokens* and *Non Root* ones








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CapBAC Access Token Generation (4)



Tokens are digitally signed XML docs


No real constraint to have a PKI





Privacy in Capability Based Authorization





CapBAC Current Status



All development Java based

Tools/Libraries:

- Wizards (tools to be made available to all potentially involved subjects):
 - **Create Capability Tokens (or Capability Revocation Tokens)**

Client/Server OSGi compliant library:

- Manages capability selection on the client side
- Manages access request validation on the server side
- Implements IoT@Work ENS Authorization handshake (to be adapted for other services)

CapBAC services:

- ✓ IoT@Work ENS Authorization Service: can be used as a mock-up
- CapBAC PDP Service: checks requests against capability revocations
- ✓ CapBAC Revocation Service: manages capability revocation's requests
- ✓ Client/server demo apps



CapBAC Open Issues



• *Knobs* tuning:

✓ IoT@Work Capability provides many *Knobs*: Validity period, Assigned rights, Capability revocation, Delegation, Delegation depth, Resource *Granularity*, ...

Capability Tokens:

- ✓ XML verbosity
- ✓ EXI (Efficient XML Interchange) usage: CoAP, EXI←→ XML interoperability
- ✓ More efficient encryption techniques (ECC, Id Based Encryption)
- ✓ issued capability tokens repository
- ✓ **Digital Ecosystem** approach to capability tokens generation for IoT (??)

Usability:

- ✓ Current wizards effectiveness
- ✓ Mobile devices usage

Real Contexts Validation:

- ✓ IoT@Work pilots
- ✓ FP7 IoT6
- ✓ Other contexts







Thanks for your attention!

Questions????

